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Abstract 
 
 Starting with Kori unit 1 on 2016, decontamination and dismantling projects (D&D project) of Hanbit 
1, 2, Haneul 1, 2 and Wolsung 1, 2, 3, 4 are planned at the Republic of Korea. Specifically, since Kori 
unit 1 would be the first commercial nuclear power plant for the D&D project, it is more important to 
make adequate preparation in advance. In addition, currently, KHNP (Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power) 
aims for instant decommissioning (deferment with 5 years) instead of deferred decommissioning 
(deferment with 15 ~ 30 years). According to the raw timeline that has been announced, the preparation 
stage should be managed until 2024, which is the deadline for complication on SNF (spent nuclear fuel). 
These preparations are focused on minimization of radioactive waste during the main on-site 
decontamination and dismantling process, minimization of radiation exposure to workers in the facility, 
and radiation leakage minimization to the environment. Through this, the reduction in waste 
management budget can be achieved. Especially, radioactive wastes need to be tactfully managed to 
attain efficient management of budget requirements. Among the radioactive wastes that would be 
generated, concrete, which originates from the bioshield at the primary circuit that activates due to high 
neutron absorption, has the maximum contribution. Therefore, the exact estimation and minimization 
of management wastes can only be attained by assessing the radioactive inventory in the bioshield. 
Therefore, the exact estimation and minimization of the management waste could only be achieved 
from the assessment of radioactive inventory in bioshield. Looking at the case of Connecticut Yankee 
nuclear power plant that had been decommissioned in 1968, the United States of America which is 
where a large percentage of an error on pre-radioactive inventory analysis, the error caused the 
generation of additional 163,954 of 200 L of LLW (Low-Level Waste) that lead to increasing at 228 % 
of waste management budget and eventually concluded to delaying and change on whole D&D project. 
In order to prevent such failure, specific modeling on radioactivity inventory of Kori unit 1 has been 
done. Before the initiation of modeling on Kori unit 1, literature review and case study on radioactive 
inventory assessment in similar foreign nuclear power plants were made for identification of variables 
and information which should be identified on the modeling. Based on the case study, the research is 
objective to investigate the radioactivity inventory of the bioshield on Kori unit 1 and estimated the 
potential amount and cost of radioactive waste managing and give guidance to workers form external 
dose analysis. In addition, compared to studies on other foreign nuclear power plants, three-dimensional 
neutron flux distribution and nuclides behavior after the shutdown of the facility with time passes were 
also considered. Trojan nuclear power plant was used as benchmark for validation of the computation 
model for ensuring the reliability of it. On-site monitoring on radioactivity that had been initiated by 
IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) and result with MCNP 6 was compared and verified for 
its reliability. After the verification had been completed, specific Kori unit 1 bioshield assessment with 
MCNP 6 based on Monte Carlo probability theory was adopted with Boltzmann neutron transport 
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scheme and activity of 60Co, 152Eu, 154Eu, and 134Cs which hold high sensitivity on regulation for 
clearance on Republic of Korea was assessed with MS-EXCEL adopting Bateman balance theory. 
Based on radioactivity inventory analysis, the regulation for clearance level was adopted and the amount 
of the potential LLW has been estimated with an additional change of them from 5 to 30 years after the 
shutdown of Kori unit 1. Finally, the potential external dose to workers on bioshield was classified using 
VISIPLAN 4.0 ALARA adopting governing balance scheme. As a result, the bioshield in Kori unit 1 
showed average an 812 Bq/g of contamination with major radioactive nuclide as 60Co. The clearance 
boundary was estimated as 425 cm from the reactor core with potential 3689 of LLW drums generation 
and 44 M USD would be required on managing. The average permittable working time was an average 
14 hours. The research provides results within a reasonable amount of error and can be utilized as a 
basic tool to assess other domestic PWR nuclear power plants. 
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Ⅰ. Introduction 
1.1 Decommissioning: The Emerging Challenges 
With the sudden change in the extension of operating-time in nuclear power plant, 10 nuclear 
power plants are determined to be shut-down and decommissioned according to the instruction of 
the National Assembly Budget Office [1]. Which are Kori unit 1, 2, 3, 4, Hanbit unit 1, 2, Haneul 
unit 1, 2, and Wolsung unit 1, 2, 3, 4. Especially since Kori unit 1, which has been licensed on 
1972.05.31 and operated since 1978.04.29 until 2017.06.18 would be the first domestic 
commercial nuclear power plant for undergoing decommission. According to Figure 1, raw 
timeline for Kori unit 1 decommissioning and dismantling project (D&D project) consists of four 
major parts. D&D basic plan design stage for handling schedule for the whole process, D&D plan 
licensing for taking authorization from the regulator, D&D initiating waste management with 
practical field works with on-site and off-site and finally the site restoration which evaluates 
radiation impact monitoring to an environment that completes D&D project concluded as license 
termination. Specific analysis for preparing decontamination and dismantling should be managed 
before 2024.12 that transportation of spent nuclear fuel finishes in order to get the license on 
starting of the D&D project [2]. Since the D&D project on Kori unit 1 demands for instant 
decommissioning not deferred decommissioning, most of the critical preparations are not yet been 
initiated. It is necessary to manage the required analysis on time to accomplish the minimization 
of radioactive waste, minimization of radiation impact on workers, and minimization of 
environmental impact with radiation which ultimately concludes to the minimization of 
management budget for D&D project [3].   
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Figure 1. Raw timeline of Kori unit 1 nuclear power plant D&D project [2] 
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1.2 The Importance of the Radioactivity Inventory: Safety and economics 
To minimize the budget for D&D project, it is crucial to determine the right scheme for each 
process of the project, which is consisted of dismantling, decontamination, and waste managing. 
For selecting the right scheme, adequate prediction is necessary, and this can be performed through 
pre-analysis using computational modeling before initiating the real onsite work. 
 
1.2.1 Radioactivity Assessment on Kori unit 1 Bioshield 
As shown on Table 1, most of the percentage of D&D project budget comprises radioactive 
waste managing budget [4]. Therefore, to minimize the D&D project budget, it is important to 
reduce the cost of waste management. As shown in Figure 2, the highest portion among 
radioactive waste, concrete contributes to a major portion, which is 75 % of the total. Most of 
this radioactive concrete is generated from the primary circuit of the nuclear power plant as 
shown in Fig 4, due to high neutron absorption along the duration of facility operating. 
Specifically, bioshield which holds the front defense line of the primary circuit including 
nuclear reactor core [5]. 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Nuclear power plant D&D managing budget [4] 
Process Budget (M. USD) Percentage (%) 
Facility shut down 
D&D license 
authorization 
122 43 
SNF transport 
Facility bulkhead 
Dismantling 93 34 
Waste managing 62 23 
Total 277 100 
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Figure 2. Major activation on the primary circuit of the nuclear power plant [5] 
 
1.2.2 Computer Modeling on Spatial Radioactivity 
 
As bioshield is highly activated from the neutron flux originated from the reactor core, it has 
a high potential risk for workers on accessing the site without pre-risk assessment. Therefore, 
pre-analysis using computer modeling is required. Undoubtedly, computational modeling itself 
requires a sensitivity test compare to that of on-site coring. However, computer modeling with 
reasonable state of error could enable the minimization of uncertainty on coring to targeted spot 
samples, which concludes the insurance of worker safety from the radioactive hazards, 
encouraging optimization of concrete dismantling and decontamination method, and 
minimizing waste generated from the process that ultimately enables minimization of the 
managing budget on radioactive waste handling [6]. Handling waste management budget is a 
crucial part in the whole D&D process, which could be found at the case for Connecticut Yankee 
nuclear power plant at United States of America that was decommissioned at 2006.06.17 [7]. 
For the Connecticut Yankee D&D project’s pre-estimation of the amount of radioactive waste 
specifically Low-Level Waste (LLW), it occurred a huge portion of an error on prediction. Later 
it showed additional 163,954 of 200 L drums of LLW so that caused extra 228 % of total 
additional waste management budget so that delayed the entire D&D project. 
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Ⅱ. Literature Review 
2.1 Case of Radioactivity Estimation for Bioshield 
As Kori unit 1 is the first commercial nuclear power plant to be decommissioned, there is limited 
information, from facility specification to analysis methods. To address this lack of information 
and determine the necessary variables for Kori unit 1 bioshield activation analysis, it is crucial to 
evaluate previous cases which were initiated on the globe. As shown in Table 2, by 2011, 129 
nuclear power plants on the globe have been shut down and waiting for their decommissioning [8]. 
Although several nations hold experiences in the D&D project, a majority of them initiated D&D 
project based on experimental measurement before initiation of the dismantling and 
decontamination process not verifying with computer modeling. For ensuring worker safety and 
estimation of adequate budget on waste management, pre-analysis via computing modeling on 
activation is crucial. From the point of view on verification with computer modeling, major nations 
that hold background with Pressurized-Waster-Reactor (PWR) which is similar to Kori unit 1, are 
United States of America, United Kingdom, and Italy.  
 
Table 2. Global shut down Nuclear Power Plant (2011) [8] 
Country Number of Nuclear power plant 
United States of America 28 
United Kingdom 26 
Germany 19 
France 12 
Japan 9 
Russian Federation 5 
Ukraine 4 
Italy 4 
Bulgaria 4 
Sweden 3 
Slovak Republic 3 
Canada 3 
Spain 2 
Lithuania 2 
Switzerland 1 
Netherlands 1 
Kazakhstan 1 
Belgium 1 
Armenia 1 
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2.1.1 United States of America 
Decommissioning in United States of America resembles most to that in the Republic of Korea. 
It went through the stage of changes on regulation in 1996, where the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) declared to submit a final decommissioning plan within two years after the 
shutdown of the facility. The final plan should indicate characterization data from the shutdown 
facility to planning of decommissioning activities and radioactive waste disposal activities. 
However, on 1996.07.29 such regulation changed for the practical application of the project 
initiation, and new requires does not stand for detailed characterization of the facility before 
the start of the deactivation activities. It only requires enough characterization for assisting 
worker safety during the deactivation and preparing it for decommission. The site 
characterization with major nuclides includes a description of remaining dismantling activities, 
plans for site remediation, and plans for the final license termination radiation survey [9].  
United States of America has two major experiences with the D&D project of PWR with 
computing code pre-analysis. Trojan nuclear power plant which was shut down in 1992, and 
Rancho-Seco nuclear power plant which was shut down in 1989. Trojan nuclear power plant 
was operated from 1976 to 1992.11 with 9 Effective Full Power Year (EFPY) and holds 1095 
MW(e) of generating capacity. The ANISN computing code was used for modeling the 
radioactivity inventory in the activated in core components, reactor vessel, and bioshield 
neutron flux distribution. For activation analysis, ORIGEN-2 code was adopted. Both neutron 
flux distribution and activation analysis were cross-checked with on-site monitoring during the 
decontamination procedure. As described in Table 3, activated levels of components on the 
Trojan nuclear plant were evaluated from 9 EFPY to 30 EFPY. Each EFPY cases were divided 
into 3 divisions which are 0 years, 10 years, and 100 years after shut-down of the facility. Case 
on 9 EFPY for 0 years after shut-down was evaluated as on-site monitoring of the samples and 
others were evaluated with computing code scheme. Each component was modeled using 
ANISN code as one-dimensional neutron transport analysis, which leads to only the result of 
bulk activation of each region of interest could be found. In addition, only total activation 
changes could be valid for the time period after shut-down. It is crucial to evaluate not only the 
total activation of the contaminated region but also the classification in each region via distance 
and height that evaluate clearance boundary for each component. Although Origen-2 code was 
used for the contribution of each radioactive nuclide level, only on the case for 9 EFPY 0 years 
after shut-down was analyzed. It is necessary to evaluate each major radioactive nuclide 
contribution via each year after shut-down in order to enhance the accuracy and reliability of 
classification regulatory approach [10]. 
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Table 3. Radioactive inventory of materials in Trojan nuclear power plant (Bq) [10] 
 9 EFPY 30 EFPY 
Activated 
Components 
0 years 10 years 100 years 0 years 10 years 100 years 
Core Shroud 1.11E+17 9.16E+15 1.63E+15 1.13E+17 9.32E+15 1.66E+15 
Core Barrel 1.21E+16 9.98E+14 1.78E+14 2.17E+16 1.79E+15 3.19E+14 
Thermal 
Shields 
2.89E+15 2.38E+14 4.25E+13 4.82E+15 3.98E+14 7.09E+13 
Vessel Inner 
Cladding 
1.07E+15 8.83E+13 1.57E+13 4.20E+13 3.47E+12 6.17E+11 
Vessel Wall 3.01E+14 2.19E+13 6.89E+11 4.33E+14 3.15E+13 9.92E+11 
Upper Grid 
Plate 
1.55E+15 1.28E+14 2.28E+13 8.03E+14 6.62E+13 1.18E+13 
Lower Grid 
Plate 
8.36E+15 6.90E+14 1.23E+14 1.82E+16 1.50E+15 2.68E+14 
Bioshield 3.57E+13 2.32E+12 1.22E+11 4.45E+13 2.89E+12 1.52E+11 
Contamination 
of Inner 
Surfaces 
8.10E+13 1.30E+13 2.75E+11 1.80E+14 2.88E+13 6.12E+11 
Totals 1.37E+17 1.13E+16 2.01E+15 1.59E+17 1.31E+16 2.33E+15 
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Rancho Seco nuclear power plant which was operated from 1975.3 to 1989.6 with 6 EFPY 
and holds 913 MW(e) of generating capacity. ANISN and ORIGEN-2 computing code were 
used as the same as the case of Trojan nuclear power plant. Each major component analyzed 
via time period after shut-down on 2 years, 11 years, 21 years, and 31 years as shown in Table 
4. Since it was using the same one-dimensional analysis code ANSIN, the only bulk status of 
activation could be analyzed. Identical in Trojan nuclear power plant case, clearance boundary 
on each time period after shut-down was not been evaluated [11]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Radioactivity inventory of materials in Rancho-Seco nuclear power plant (Bq) [11] 
Activated 
Components 
2 years 11 years 21 years 31 years 
Core Shroud 2.74E+16 6.13E+15 2.38E+15 1.52E+15 
Upper Core Barrel 2.27E+13 5.08E+12 1.97E+12 1.26E+12 
Lower Core Barrel 5.56E+15 1.24E+15 4.83E+14 3.08E+14 
Thermal Shields 1.76E+15 3.94E+14 1.53E+14 9.75E+13 
Vessel Cladding 6.36E+12 1.42E+12 5.53E+11 3.52E+11 
Vessel Wall 7.32E+13 1.64E+13 6.36E+12 4.06E+12 
Control 
Rods/Guides 
6.53E+15 1.46E+15 5.67E+14 3.62E+14 
Top Grid/Plenum 1.84E+16 4.12E+15 1.60E+15 1.02E+15 
Lower Forging 1.36E+16 3.04E+15 1.18E+15 7.53E+14 
Orifice 
Rods/Retainers 
6.38E+14 1.43E+14 5.54E+13 3.53E+13 
Burnable Poison 
Rods 
1.27E+16 2.84E+15 1.10E+15 7.04E+14 
Bioshield 1.91E+13 3.53E+12 1.23E+12 6.53E+11 
Contaminated Inner 
Surfaces 
1.21E+14 1.25E+13 2.00E+12 8.30E+11 
Total 8.72E+16 1.95E+16 7.57E+15 4.82E+15 
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2.1.2 United Kingdom 
In the case of the United Kingdom, statutory and economic value dominate characterization 
program for decommissioning. Characterization of the program includes waste quantities 
estimation and classification under national categories VLLWs (Very Low-Level Wastes), LLWs 
(Low-Level Wastes), and ILWs (Intermediate Level Wastes) followed by selecting appropriate 
storage and disposal method. The classification of waste categories could be defined from pre-
analysis categorization and hence control the costs and safety of packaging, storage, and disposal. 
The inventory of radioactive materials is determined in order to enable radiation fields to be 
estimated during the dismantling procedure so that such work can be conducted according to 
ALARA (As Low as Reasonably Achievable) principle [12].  
Although the United Kingdom has no experience of D&D project with computer modeling pre-
analysis on PWR but holds experience on the gas cooled reactor. Windscale Advanced Gas Cooled 
Reactor (WAGR) was operated from 1963 to 1981. ANSIN neutron transport code was used on 
neutron flux calculation on the void region [13]. Especially different form PWR, neutron streaming 
in the void region. Result of WAGR remains as overall components on activities. As shown in Table 
5, 55Fe and 60Co were the majority on all components and 3H, 60Co, and 152Eu were majored 
specifically, on reinforced concrete. Different from the case on Trojan and Ranco-Seco on the 
United States of America, analysis on each component was not been done but monitoring on whole 
waste was initiated. Due to using of one-dimensional analysis code ANSIN, which holds limit on 
geometry specification, leaded activity data on the only classification to which part holds the most 
impact. 
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Table 5. Radioactivity inventory of materials in WAGR (TBq) [13] 
Radionuclides Activity 
3H 44 
14C 4.7 
36Cl 0.088 
41Ca 0.121 
54Mn 0.004 
55Fe 1858 
59Ni 6.8 
60Co 692 
63Ni 698 
93mNb 0.168 
94Nb 0.042 
152Eu 1.12 
154Eu 1.39 
155Eu 0.37 
Total 3306 
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2.1.3 Italy 
 
D&D project on Italy is mainly focused on safe containment of the facility which is different 
from the United States of America that holds focus on safe license termination of the site. Which 
is why the related regulation stands for minimum two-dimensional assessment for neutron flux 
and activity of the contaminated site with a reasonable amount of time duration after the 
shutdown and decommissioning of the facility [14]. Although most of the nuclear power plants 
on Italy are still on their process of extensive sampling, the D&D cases on Trino and Caorso 
nuclear power plant hold meaning that their usage of two-dimensional analysis approach which 
did not initiate in the United States of America and the United Kingdom.  
Trino nuclear power plant is a pressurized water reactor type that operated from 1964 to 1987 
with 870 MW(e). Its analysis on neutron flux was based on two-dimensional computing code 
DOT 3.5 and the activity of the contaminated site was evaluated with Origen-S computing code. 
As shown in Table 6, the total radioactivity of the waste was evaluated with diverse radioactive 
nuclides. In addition, as shown in Table 7, activity on bioshield was evaluated under 60Co, 134Cs, 
152Eu, and 154Eu were used as comparison radioactive nuclides. Same as other activity analysis 
on the United States of America and the United Kingdom, no spatial analysis was done, which 
led no result on the identification of clearance boundary nor amount of the waste amount [15]. 
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Table 6. Calculated activities from neutron activation in Trino nuclear power plant (TBq) [15] 
Radionuclides Activity 
3H 2.8 
14C 0.06 
36Cl 0.02 
39Ar 0.84 
41Ca 0.0002 
54Mn 0.49 
55Fe 835 
60Co 983 
59Ni 6.0 
63Ni 700 
90Sr 0.0005 
93Mo 0.0006 
93mNb 0.03 
94Nb 0.02 
108Ag 0.04 
108mAg 0.4 
133Ba 0.001 
134Cs 0.9 
151Sm 0.02 
152Eu 0.01 
154Eu 0.2 
155Eu 0.04 
166mHo 0.000007 
Total 2560 
 
Table 7. Radioactivity inventory of a Trino for major components (Bq) [15] 
Components Activity 
Internals 4.27E+15 
Control rods 1.16E+15 
Vessel 3.52E+14 
Neutron shield 2.47E+12 
Biological shield 9.39E+9 
Total 5.7E+15 
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Caorso nuclear power plant is a Boiling-Water-Reactor (BWR) that operated from 1979 to 
1986 with 2590 MW(e). Same with the analysis on Trino nuclear power plant, DOT 3.5 
computing code was adopted as two-dimensional analysis on neutron flux and Origen-S 
computing code was used for activity assessment. As shown in Table 8 and 9, the average 
radioactivity of major nuclides was assessed under the condition of decades after the shutdown 
of the nuclear power plant [16].  
 
 
 
Table 8. Calculated activities from neutron activation in Caorso nuclear power plant (TBq) [16] 
Radionuclides Activity 
3H 3.0 
14C 0.7 
36Cl 0.01 
39Ar 15.8 
41Ca 0.001 
54Mn 0.7 
55Fe 1971 
60Co 4375 
59Ni 4.7 
63Ni 554 
90Sr 0.004 
93Mo 0.01 
93mNb 0.3 
94Nb 0.009 
108Ag 0.002 
108mAg 0.06 
133Ba 0.09 
134Cs 17.2 
151Sm 0.09 
152Eu 0.4 
154Eu 6.5 
155Eu 1.7 
166mHo 2.2 
Total 7680 
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Table 9. Radioactive inventory of a Caorso for major components (Bq) [16] 
Components Activity 
Internals 1.28E+16 
Fuel cases 2.44E+15 
Control rods 3.4E+15 
Reactor pressure vessel 3.84E+13 
Sacrificial shield 6.18E+11 
Biological shield 3.33E+9 
Dry well 1.51E+10 
Total 1.8E+16 
 
Overall, all nations showed a lack of spatial distribution of radioactivity. Since the regulations 
on D&D pre-analysis of the United States of America and the United Kingdom require only a 
one-dimensional approach on the region of interests, their result on radioactivity assessment 
only concluded to the summation of total radioactivity. Although the regulation on Italy 
demands two-dimensional analysis on neutron flux, there is limited information of radioactivity 
on the specific region of interests. Since the regulation on Italy focused on containment of the 
contamination, the radioactivity inventory was assessed after the decontamination and 
dismantling not on-site during the dismantling process or before the decontamination process. 
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2.2 Improvements Needed: Connection to Safety and Waste 
 
Concluded from the case reviews on bioshield activation analysis of foreign major nuclear power 
plants decommissioning, it is clear that total radioactivity of the site is different from site to site as 
shown in Table 10. The radioactivity was diverse due to their difference in the specification such 
as geometry, reactor type, power density, and operation history. Therefore, it is possible to reference 
same PWR decommissioning case but specific modeling on Kori unit 1 is required. Especially 
spatial distribution of radioactivity assessment is necessary in order to estimate the clearance 
boundary which leads to optimization of the amount of the radioactive waste and estimate accurate 
external dose for ensuring worker safety. As shown in Table 11, specifically three-dimensional 
neutron transport, clearance boundary, external dose, waste managing budget, and time duration 
analysis should be targeted variables to be clarified from this research. 
 
Table 10. Radioactivity inventory of bioshield on nuclear power plants [Bq] 
Facility Reactor type Activity 
Trino PWR 9.39E+09 
Trojan PWR 4.45E+13 
Rancho Seco PWR 1.91E+13 
Caorso BWR 3.33E+09 
Kori-1 GCR 3.30E+03 
 
 
Table 11. Targeted analysis point on the research: improvements needed from previous studies 
Facility Researcher 
3D neutron 
transport 
analysis 
Time 
duration 
analysis 
Clearance 
boundary 
analysis 
External dose 
analysis 
Waste managing 
budget analysis 
Trino IAEA × × × × × 
Trojan 
Portland 
general 
electronic 
× ○ × × × 
Rancho Seco IAEA × × × × × 
Caorso IAEA × × × × × 
WAGR IAEA × × × × × 
Kori-1 
Donghyun 
Lee [UNIST] 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
Trino IAEA × × × × × 
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Ⅲ. Research Design 
3.1 Research Objectives and Approaches 
 
Based on the literature reviews and case studies associated with bioshield activation analysis 
among major foreign nuclear power plants, it is possible to conclude the concept and design flow 
of the research. This study is objective to analyze the Kori unit 1 bioshield spatial activation using 
computational modeling. It is aimed to first identify and clarify spatial neutron flux distribution 
using MCNP 6 than calculate the spatial radioactivity using MS-EXCEL function with neutron 
flux result. In addition, external dose analysis using VISIPLAN 4.0 in order to assess the worker 
safety and finally leads to the estimation of the clearance boundary on bioshield with assessing the 
amount of the waste and its managing budget as well. 
As shown in Figure 3, the flow of the research could be divided into three steps. First, the 
preparation of the research that includes a literature review and case study on pressurized water 
reactor (Trino, Trojan, and Rancho-Seco), boiling water reactor (Caorso), and gas-cooled reactor 
(WAGR) in order to identify the objective and aim of the research. In addition, for validation of 
the computational model which would be used on modeling of the Kori unit 1, the validation is 
made by comparing the bioshield radioactivity between on-site monitoring result and the result of 
MCNP 6 for Trojan nuclear power plant. After the validation of the modeling scheme finishes with 
reliability verified, the second part of the study is initiated. The second main work of the research 
includes three-dimensional modeling on Kori unit 1 with facility configurations and operation 
history, and activation analysis with targeted radioactive nuclides. Finally, the third part, three 
major variables that crucial on preparation for decommissioning would be discussed, which are the 
classification of clearance boundary, assessment of the radioactive waste amount, and evaluation 
of external dose rate to workers.  
The targeted radioactive nuclides are 60Co, 152Eu, 154Eu, and 134Cs, which hold the highest 
sensitivity on the regulation of radioactive waste clearance level on Republic of Korea [18]. As 
shown in Table 12, except for 129I, their limitation on clearance is 0.1 Bq/g which is the highest 
level of sensitivity interests. In addition, for the case of multiple nuclides exists at the same time, 
the total summation percentage should be below 1 as shown in Equation 1 [19]. 
∑
𝐶𝑖
𝐶𝐿,𝑖
< 1𝑖                                                                    (1) 
Here, 𝐶𝑖 is the radioactivity of nuclide i (Bq/g) and 𝐶𝐿,𝑖 is the radioactivity limitation of nuclide 
i (Bq/g). 
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Table 12. Clearance level on radioactive nuclide in the Republic of Korea [18] 
Radioactive nuclide 
Clearance Level 
(Bq/g) 
129I 0.01 
60Co, 152Eu, 154Eu, 134Cs 0.1 
14C, 59Fe, 90Sr 1 
7Be, 18F 10 
3H, 35S 100 
31Si, 32P 1,000 
58mCo, 71Ge 10,000 
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Figure 3. Research flow 
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3.2 Mathematical Equation and Numerical Methods 
 
The main part of the research which is the three-dimensional modeling of Kori unit 1 and 
radioactivity inventory analysis requires three major parts of mathematical principles. First, 
neutron transport should be described from the defining of source term which is the reactor core 
shown in Figure 4, using the Boltzmann neutron transport equation [19]. The reactor core which 
is the ground zero of the neutron generation has been simplified as cylindrical volume. Watt fission 
spectrum was chosen for describing the flux of the particles as shown in Equation 2. 
 
[
1
𝑉
𝜕
𝜕𝑡
+ 𝛺𝛻 + ∑(𝑟, 𝐸, 𝑡)] ∅(𝑟, 𝛺, 𝐸, 𝑡) = ∫ 𝑑𝐸′ ∫ 𝑑𝛺′ ∑ (𝑟, 𝛺′𝛺, 𝐸′ → 𝐸)∅(𝑟, 𝛺′, 𝐸′, 𝑡) +𝑠4𝜋
∞
0
𝜒(𝐸)
4𝜋
∫ 𝑑𝐸′ ∫ 𝑑𝛺′𝑣(𝐸′) ∑ (𝑟, 𝐸′, 𝑡)∅(𝑟, 𝛺′, 𝐸′, 𝑡)𝑓4𝜋 + 𝑄(𝑟, 𝛺, 𝐸, 𝑡)
∞
0
                      (2) 
As shown in Figure 4, in this stage of the work, MCNP 6 (General purpose Monte Carlo N-
Particle code) was adopted. Kori unit 1 specification including geometry and material properties 
of each part on the structure, operation history which is EFPY (Effective Full Power Year), and 
power density were used as input of the code. From the usage of MCNP 6 spatial distribution of 
neutron flux could be detected. In order to match the minimum relative error 1% that is 
recommended for giving reliability under the level of possible usage on regulators, NPS (number 
of particles) was managed as 1 × 109. 
Second, radioactivity inventory should be analyzed using the Bateman equation in Equation 3 
[19]. MS-EXCEL was adopted. For input of the stage, neutron flux which is generated from the 
MCNP 6, Bioshield specification including geometry and material properties were used.  
 
𝑑𝑁1
𝑑𝑡
= −𝜆1𝑁1, 
𝑑𝑁𝑖
𝑑𝑡
= 𝜆𝑖−1𝑁𝑖−1 − 𝜆𝑖𝑁𝑖                                                 (3) 
 
Specifically, after modeling of neutron flux distribution analysis using MCNP 6 was completed, 
activation of nuclides on bioshield should be initiated. Bateman equation which stands equilibrium 
of radioactive nuclide on generation and decay is: 
 
−dn(t) = λn(t)dt                                                             (4) 
where -dn(t) is the rate of nuclides change on time t; λ is the decay constant (hr-1). From integration 
on both side of the balance on t, the equation could be changed as 
 
𝑛(𝑡) = 𝑛0𝑒
−𝜆𝑡                                                               (5) 
radioactive nuclide’s decay consists of decay term and production: 
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dn
dt
= −λn + R                                                                (6) 
where R is the term for generated nuclides, the total balance of the nuclides during the radioactive 
decay could be shown as: 
 
n = 𝑛0𝑒
−𝜆𝑡 +
𝑅
𝜆
(1 − 𝑒𝜆𝑡)                                                      (7) 
From this stage of the work, it is possible to identify the radioactivity of the targeted radioactive 
nuclides which are 60Co, 152Eu, 154Eu, and 134Cs.  
Third, the external dose rate should be identified using Governing equation on Equation 8 [19]. 
VISIPLAN 4.0 computation code was used. The radioactivity converted into potential dose rate 
via dose conversion factor of each nuclide [20]. The input of the stage is the radioactivity of the 
targeted nuclides that were identified at the previous stage with the usage of MS-EXCEL. 
 
𝜕𝑛
𝜕𝑡
= 𝑠 − ∑ 𝜙𝑎 − 𝛻. 𝐽                                                          (8) 
 
3.3 Defining of Source Term 
 
In order to describe neutron behavior, it is crucial to design adequate model for source term. The 
research contains two source terms. First, at the stage on radioactivity inventory assessment of the 
bioshield, it would be reactor core that has been simplified as volumetric cylinder. Effective full 
power years were chosen as input parameter instead of entire operation history in order to make 
conservative approach for reinforcing reliability of the result. Second, at the stage on assessing 
potential external dose to workers, the source term would be activated bioshield itself since the 
reactor core already should be removed before starting of dismantling and decontamination process 
on the bioshield. The bioshield was modeled as homogenous material property since exact blue 
print of reinforcing steel bar could not be identified. In addition, the impurity concentration was 
assumed in order to clarify the pre-material condition of the bioshield. 
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Figure 4. Numerical computation stage of the research 
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Ⅳ. Method Validation against Trojan Nuclear Power Plant 
4.1 Trojan Modeling Condition 
 
Since there is no pre-assessment case on domestic pressurized water reactor case study on foreign 
similar nuclear power plants had been done, as shown in Table 13, and Figure 5, from the case 
study, Trojan nuclear power plant showed the highest similarity with Kori unit 1. Specifically, 
reactor type as PWR, and geometry of the structures. Validation on MCNP 6 general-purpose 
Monte Carlo N-Particle code scheme was taken from the assessment on Trojan nuclear power plant. 
MCNP 6 was used for assessment of activation on bioshield. Structure from the reactor core to 
bioshield has been designed. Due to the lack of information on the exact blueprint of Trojan, rough 
design parameters were decided. Although the targeted area for evaluation is bioshield, whole 
structure on the primary circuit should be designed, since the neutron absorption effect should be 
considered on each part of the structure. The reactor core, barrel, bypass, pressure vessel, air, and 
bioshield was shaped as cylindrically. Specifically, bioshield was designed with two cylinders with 
two different diameters and height for more exact reflection of real geometry. Detailed input 
information on each structure was density, volume and nuclides composition as in material 
composition shown in Table 14, with geometry information shown in Table 15. Each structure 
was assumed as a homogeneous material status with no hole or gap inside [21]. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 13. Modeling configurations on Trojan and Kori unit 1 [21] 
Facility Trojan Kori unit 1 
Bioshield radius 520 cm 530 cm 
Bioshield height 1485 cm 1485 cm 
EFPY 9 year 30 year 
Power density 1095 Mw(e) 576 Mw(e) 
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Figure 5. Radius comparison on Kori unit 1 and Trojan nuclear power plant [21] 
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Table 14. Trojan structure material/physical properties [g/g] [10] 
Nuclei 
Carbon 
Steel 
Stainless 
Steel 
Concrete 
Nuclei 
Carbon 
Steel 
Stainless 
Steel 
Concrete 
U 2.00E-07 2.00E-07 2.70E-06 Ni 6.60E-03 6.00E-03 3.80E-05 
Th 1.80E-07 1.80E-07 3.50E-06 Co 1.22E-04 1.90E-04 9.80E-06 
Pb 8.20E-04 8.20E-04 6.10E-05 Fe 9.84E-01 9.84E-01 1.40E-02 
W 5.50E-06 5.50E-06 1.40E-06 Mn 1.00E-02 1.27E-02 3.77E-04 
Ta 1.30E-07 1.30E-07 4.40E-07 Cr 1.70E-03 4.80E-04 1.09E-04 
Hf 2.10E-07 2.10E-07 2.20E-06 V 8.00E-05 2.00E-06 1.03E-04 
Lu 2.00E-07 2.00E-07 2.70E-07 Ti 2.00E-06 2.00E-06 2.12E-03 
Yb 1.00E-06 1.00E-06 1.40E-06 Sc 2.60E-07 2.60E-07 6.50E-06 
Ho 8.00E-07 8.00E-07 9.00E-07 Ca 1.40E+05 1.40E-05 4.40E-02 
Dy   2.30E-06 K 1.20E-05 1.20E-05 1.30E-02 
Tb 4.50E-07 4.50E-07 4.10E-07 Cl 4.00E-05 4.00E-05 4.50E-05 
Eu 3.10E-08 3.10E+08 5.50E-07 S 5.00E-04 1.60E-04 3.10E-03 
Sm 1.70E-08 1.70E-08 2.00E-06 P 5.00E-04 1.10E-04 5.00E-03 
Ce 1.00E-06 1.00E-06 2.43E-05 Si  2.00E-03 3.37E-01 
La 1.00E-07 1.00E-07 1.30E-05 Al 3.30E-04 2.10E-04 3.40E-02 
Ba 2.73E-04 2.73E-04 9.50E-04 Mg   2.00E-03 
Cs 2.00E-07 2.00E-07 1.30E-06 Na 2.30E-05 2.30E-05 1.60E-02 
Sb 1.10E-05 1.10E-05 1.80E-06 O   5.29E-01 
Sn 7.00E-06 7.00E-06 7.00E-06 N 8.40E-05 7.00E-06 1.20E-04 
Cd   3.00E-07 C 2.90E-03 2.10E-03 1.00E-03 
Ag 2.00E-06 2.00E-06 2.00E-07 B   2.00E-05 
Pd   3.00E-06 Li 3.00E-07 3.00E-07 2.00E-05 
Mo 5.60E-07 4.30E-03 1.03E-05 H   1.00E-02 
Nb 1.88E-05 1.88E-05 4.30E-06     
Zr 1.00E-05 1.00E-05 7.10E-05     
Y 2.00E-05 2.00E-05 1.82E-05     
Sr 1.50E-07 1.50E-07 4.38E-04     
Rb 4.80E-05 4.80E-05 3.50E-05     
Br 8.50E-07 8.50E-07 2.40E-06     
Se 7.00E-07 7.00E-07 9.20E-07     
As 5.32E-04 5.32E-04 7.90E-06     
Ga 8.00E-05 8.00E-05 8.80E-06     
Zn 1.00E-04 1.00E-04 7.50E-05     
Cu 2.00E-03 1.50E-03 2.50E-05     
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Table 15. Specific design factors of Trojan [10] 
 
Cell 
Distance from the 
core (cm) 
Core 138 
Barrel 188 
Bypass 198 
Pressure vessel 219 
Air 307 
Concrete 520 
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4.2 Radioactivity Assessment Validation 
 
After the modeling of the Trojan using MCNP 6, the radioactivity of the targeted nuclides on 
bioshield was assessed for the validation of the reliability of the MCNP 6 computation modeling. 
Before initiating the modeling on Kori unit 1 bioshield, it is necessary to verify the modeling with 
a reasonable margin of error [22, 23]. The difference ratio between computer modeling result at 
IAEA versus on-site monitoring and MCNP 6 modeling result versus on-site monitoring was 
compared.  
As shown in Figure 6, and Table 16, the on-site monitoring result on 60Co was maximum 
7.03E+03 Bq/g on 304.75 cm region to minimum 7.03E-03 Bq/g on 516.75 cm point. IAEA 
computation modeling showed maximum 1.11E+04 Bq/g on 304.75 cm, and minimum 2.18E+01 
Bq/g on 410.75 cm. Although the on-site monitoring result showed its minimum radioactivity at 
516.75 cm, IAEA modeling was unable to achieve its radioactivity on the same region due to the 
limit of detection on ANSIN code. With the case of MCNP 6 the maximum radioactivity showed 
as 9.49E+03 Bq/g on 304.75 cm, and minimum 1.22E-02 Bq/g on 516.75 cm. The average 
difference ratio on IAEA modeling and MCNP 6 showed +89.6 % and +57.3 %.  
As shown in Figure 7, and Table 17, the on-site monitoring result on 152Eu was maximum 
9.25E+03 Bq/g on 304.75 cm region to minimum 8.51E-03 Bq/g on 516.75 cm point. IAEA 
computation modeling showed maximum 1.07E+04 Bq/g on 304.75 cm, and minimum 2.55E+01 
Bq/g on 410.75 cm. Although the on-site monitoring result showed its minimum radioactivity at 
516.75 cm, IAEA modeling was unable to achieve its radioactivity on the same region due to the 
limit of detection on ANSIN code. With the case of MCNP 6 the maximum radioactivity showed 
as 1.17E+04 Bq/g on 304.75 cm, and minimum 1.35E-02 Bq/g on 516.75 cm. The average 
difference ratio on IAEA modeling and MCNP 6 showed +50.0 % and +33.2 %.  
As shown in Figure 8, and Table 18, the on-site monitoring result on 154Eu was maximum 
9.99E+02 Bq/g on 304.75 cm region to minimum 3.37E-02 Bq/g on 463.75 cm point. IAEA 
computation modeling was unable to detect the radioactivity on the whole region of bioshield since 
its radioactivity is lower than the limit of detection. However, MCNP 6 showed maximum 
radioactivity as 1.26E+03 Bq/g on 304.75 cm, and minimum as 5.39E-02 Bq/g at 463.75 cm. 
Although the difference ratio with modeling on IAEA could not be compared, the average 
difference with MCNP 6 versus on-site monitoring showed +40.4 % which was lower than that of 
60Co case. 
As shown in Figure 9, and Table 19, the on-site monitoring result on 134Cs was maximum 
3.52E+02 Bq/g on 304.75 cm region to minimum 7.40E-03 Bq/g on 463.75 cm point. IAEA 
computation modeling was unable to detect the radioactivity on the whole region of bioshield since 
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its radioactivity is lower than the limit of detection. However, MCNP 6 showed maximum 
radioactivity as 4.26E+02 Bq/g on 304.75 cm, and minimum as 1.03E-02 Bq/g at 463.75 cm. 
Although the difference ratio with modeling on IAEA could not be compared, the average 
difference with MCNP 6 versus on-site monitoring showed +29.2 % which was lower than that of 
60Co case. 
As shown in Figure 10 and Table 20, the maximum difference ratio on 60Co, 152Eu, 154Eu, and 
134Cs were compared as 100 % criteria and compared with IAEA ORIGEN-2 and MCNP 6 
computation modeling. Overall, MCNP 6 modeling showed higher sensitivity on all radioactive 
nuclides since IAEA ORIGEN-2 showed relatively conservative result on radioactivity compared 
to MCNP 6. Comparing from targeted radioactive nuclides, MCNP 6 showed a reasonable margin 
of difference so that could be converted on the modeling on Kori unit 1.  
 
Table 16. 60Co radioactivity concentration 
 
  IAEA Donghyun Lee Difference ratio 
 ORIGEN-2 (1) Measured (2) MCNP 6 (3) (1) vs (2) (3) vs (2) 
304.75 1.11E+04 7.03E+03 9.49E+03 +57.9 +33.2 
357.75 9.25E+02 8.14/E+01 1.12E+02 +104.0 +38.0 
410.75 2.18E+01 1.15E+01 1.71E+01 +89.6 +49.0 
463.75 N/A 2.11E-01 3.25E-01 N/A +54.5 
516.75 N/A 7.03E-03 1.22E-02 N/A +74.1 
 
 
Figure 6. Radioactivity comparison on 60Co of Trojan nuclear power plant 
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Table 17. 152Eu radioactivity concentration 
 
  IAEA Donghyun Lee Difference ratio 
 ORIGEN-2 (1) Measured (2) MCNP 6 (3) (1) vs (2) (3) vs (2) 
304.75 1.07E+04 9.25E+03 1.17E+04 +15.7 +26.5 
357.75 1.07E+03 1.04E+02 1.35E+02 +92.9 +30.3 
410.75 2.55E+01 1.70E+01 2.31E+01 +50.0 +36.2 
463.75 N/A 2.96E-01 4.32E-01 N/A +46.0 
516.75 N/A 8.51E-03 1.35E-02 N/A +59.1 
 
 
Figure 7. Radioactivity comparison on 152Eu of Trojan nuclear power plant 
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Table 18. 154Eu radioactivity concentration 
 
  IAEA Donghyun Lee Difference ratio 
 ORIGEN-2 (1) Measured (2) MCNP 6 (3) (1) vs (2) (3) vs (2) 
304.75 N/A 9.99E+02 1.26E+03 N/A +26.0 
357.75 N/A 1.04E+01 1.35E+01 N/A +30.4 
410.75 N/A 2.04E+00 2.86E+00 N/A +40.3 
463.75 N/A 3.37E-02 5.39E-02 N/A +59.8 
516.75 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
 
 
Figure 8. Radioactivity comparison on 154Eu of Trojan nuclear power plant 
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Table 19. 134Cs radioactivity concentration 
 
  IAEA Donghyun Lee Difference ratio 
 ORIGEN-2 (1) Measured (2) MCNP 6 (3) (1) vs (2) (3) vs (2) 
304.75 N/A 3.52E+02 4.26E+02 N/A +21.0 
357.75 N/A 1.85E+00 2.28E+00 N/A +23.4 
410.75 N/A 2.78E-01 3.59E-01 N/A +29.3 
463.75 N/A 7.40E-03 1.03E-02 N/A +38.7 
516.75 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
 
 
Figure 9. Radioactivity comparison on 134Eu of Trojan nuclear power plant 
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Table 20. Difference ratio on major nuclides radioactivity 
 Radioactive 
nuclide 
IAEA 
Donghyun Lee 
[UNIST] 
60Co +89.6 % +57.3 % 
152Eu +50.0 % +33.2 % 
154Eu N/A +40.4 % 
134Cs N/A +29.2 % 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Difference ratio on major nuclides radioactivity 
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Ⅴ. Radioactivity Inventory of Bioshield in Kori unit 1 
5.1 Kori unit 1 Modeling Conditions 
 
After the validation of the MCNP 6 computation modeling has been verified for its adequate on 
usage, three-dimensional Kori unit 1 modeling is initiated. As well as for the case on Trojan nuclear 
power plant, since the exact blueprint of the Kori unit 1 could not be opened to the public, rough 
design as shown in Figure 11 and 12, and parameters of each region on the primary circuit was 
managed which is clarified on Table 20 and 21.  
In order to describe the flux of neutron which is generated from the reactor core to bioshield 
region, whole primary circuit of the nuclear power plant, which are reactor core, barrel, bypass, 
thermal shield, downcomer, pressure vessel, air, and bioshield was shaped as cylindrically. As 
shown in Table 22, each material properties and nuclide composition has been managed as the 
input of the MCNP 6. 
 
Table 21. Design factor s of Kori unit 1 and Trojan nuclear power plant  
 Reactor Pressure Vessel Bioshield EFPY 
 Height (m) Radius (m) Height (m) Radius (m) (yr) 
Trojan 13 4 14 3-5 30 
Kori-1 13 4 14 3-5 27 
 
Table 22. Specific design factors of Kori unit 1 
Cell Distance from the core 
Core 138 
Barrel 142 
Bypass 146 
Thermal shield 155 
Downcorner 167 
Pressure vessel 184 
Air 316 
Concrete 530 
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Figure 11. Basic three-dimensional structure of Kori unit 1 primary circuit 
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Figure 12. Simplified Kori unit 1 modeling configuration [21] 
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Table 23. Kori unit 1 structure material and physical properties [#/barn-cm] 
Nuclide Reactor Core Stainless Steel 
Pressure 
Vessel 
Bypass 
Downcomer 
Concrete Air 
235U 1.15E-04      
238U 6.64E-03      
239Pu 3.70E-05      
240Pu 8.86E-06      
241Pu 3.57E-06      
133Cs     1.30E-06  
151Eu     2.25E-07  
153Eu     2.25E-07  
1H 2.76E-02   4.83E-02 7.41E-03  
16O 2.68E-02   2.41E-02 4.21E-02 1.05E-03 
10B 2.30E-06   4.31E-06   
11B    1.77E-05   
27Al 1.13E-06    2.28E-03  
12C 3.57E-06 3.17E-04 8.67E-04   7.49E-07 
28Si  1.69E-03 4.38E-04  1.52E-02  
50Cr 5.51E-07 7.56E-04 1.27E-05    
52Cr 1.06E-05 1.46E-02 2.44E-04    
53Cr 1.21E-06 1.65E-03 2.77E-05    
54Cr 3.00E-07 4.11E-04 6.89E-06    
55Mn 2.16E-06 1.73E-03 5.43E-06    
54Fe 3.60E-06 3.44E-03 4.86E-03    
56Fe 5.60E-05 5.35E-02 7.55E-02    
57Fe 1.28E-06 1.23E-03 1.73E-03    
58Fe 1.71E-07 1.63E-04 2.31E-04  2.98E-04  
58Ni 9.91E-05 5.10E-03 4.01E-04    
60Ni 3.08E-05 1.97E-03 1.54E-04    
61Ni 1.66E-06 8.55E-05 6.71E-06    
62Ni 5.52E-06 2.72E-04 2.14E-05    
64Ni 1.35E-06 6.94E-05 5.45E-06    
96Mo   2.81E-04    
91Zr 4.52E-03      
23Na     1.00E-03  
24Mg     1.42E-04  
32S     5.38E-05  
39K     6.61E-04  
40Ca     2.78E-03  
Total 6.60E-02 8.70E-02 8.48E-02 7.24E-02 7.20E-02 1.05E-03 
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5.2 Radioactivity Assessment of bioshield in Kori unit 1 
 
After the three-dimensional modeling on the primary circuit of the Kori unit 1 nuclear power 
plant, the neutron flux distribution has been analyzed in order to derive the radioactivity if 60Co, 
152Eu, 154Eu, and 134Cs. The value showed minimum 1.37E-42 #/cm2s on the farthest point from the 
reactor core and maximum 1.65E+07 #/cm2s as shown in Figure 13. The tendency of the 
distribution showed exponential decreasing in the horizontal point of view and showed increasing 
tendency at the point of 300 cm from the bottom later decreasing since the reactor core is positioned 
at 300 cm from the bottom of the floor. 
 
 
Figure 13. A: Neutron flux distribution on Kori unit 1 bioshield (horizontal viewpoint), 
B: Neutron flux distribution on Kori unit 1 bioshield (vertical viewpoint) 
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60Co, 152Eu, 154Eu, and 134Cs was chosen as target radioactive nuclides under considering initial 
concentration and external dose conversion factor, which effects on radiation workers. As shown 
in Figure 14 and Table 23, the radioactivity of Kori-1 60Co showed maximum 5.22E+03 Bq/g on 
304.75 cm to minimum 3.43E-07 Bq/g on 516.75 cm. The tendency of the radioactivity showed 
correspondingly reducing along the radial distance same as neutron flux distribution. The clearance 
boundary assessed as 438 cm with the clearance level of 0.1 Bq/g. 
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Figure 14. A: 60Co radioactivity concentration  
B: 3D 60Co radioactivity 
 
Table 24. 60Co radioactivity concentration 
Distance (cm) Kori unit 1 (Bq/g) 
304.75 5.22E+03 
331.25 1.69E+03 
357.75 3.60E+02 
384.25 2.07E+01 
410.75 2.08E+00 
437.25 1.22E-01 
463.75 5.86E-07 
490.25 5.70E-07 
516.75 3.43E-07 
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As identified in Figure 15 and Table 24., 152Eu showed highest 1.63E+01 Bq/g to lowest 1.07E-
09 Bq/g. The area from 357.75 cm to 463.75 cm showed the same increasing tendency of difference 
ration which was confirmed on 60Co as well. The clearance boundary assessed as 360 cm with the 
clearance level of 0.1 Bq/g. 
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Figure 15. A: 152Eu radioactivity concentration  
B: 3D 152Eu radioactivity 
 
Table 25. 152Eu radioactivity concentration 
Distance (cm) Kori unit 1 (Bq/g) 
304.75 1.63.E+01 
331.25 5.29.E+00 
357.75 1.13.E+00 
384.25 6.47.E-02 
410.75 6.54.E-03 
437.25 3.82.E-04 
463.75 1.84.E-09 
490.25 1.79.E-09 
516.75 1.07.E-09 
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As identified in Figure 16 and Table 25, 154Eu showed largest 5.60E-01 Bq/g to smallest 3.69E-
11 Bq/g. As already identified on 60Co and 152Eu, 154Eu also showed incline of difference ratio from 
region 357.75 cm to 463.75 cm area. The clearance boundary assessed as 340 cm with the clearance 
level of 0.1 Bq/g. 
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Figure 16. A: 154Eu radioactivity concentration  
B: 3D 154Eu radioactivity 
 
Table 26. 154Eu radioactivity concentration 
Distance (cm) Kori unit 1 (Bq/g) 
304.75 5.60.E-01 
331.25 1.81.E-01 
357.75 3.86.E-02 
384.25 2.22.E-03 
410.75 1.04.E-04 
437.25 1.31.E-05 
463.75 6.29.E-11 
490.25 6.12.E-11 
516.75 3.69.E-11 
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As identified in Figure 17 and Table 26, 134Cs showed maximum 7.05E-03 Bq/g to minimum 
4.64E-13 Bq/g Different from previous result as 60Co, 152Eu and 154Eu, the comparison on 134Cs 
between Kori unit 1 and Trojan should be carefully observed since the detecting of 134Cs on Trojan 
was limited farthest to 463.75 cm as radial direction. Since the maximum radioactivity was lower 
than 0.1 Bq/g, 134Cs alone showed entire clearance on bioshield. 
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Figure 17. A: 134Cs radioactivity concentration  
B: 3D 134Cs radioactivity 
 
Table 27. 134Cs radioactivity concentration 
Distance (cm) Kori unit 1 (Bq/g) 
304.75 7.05.E-03 
331.25 2.28.E-03 
357.75 4.87.E-04 
384.25 2.79.E-05 
410.75 2.82.E-06 
437.25 1.65.E-07 
463.75 7.92.E-13 
490.25 7.71.E-13 
516.75 4.64.E-13 
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As shown in Figure 18 and Table 27, total, 60Co contributed more than 99% dominance on whole 
bioshield region followed by 152Eu, 154Eu, and 134Cs. The maximum level was 5.22E+03 Bq/g on 
304.75 cm from the reactor core and the minimum level was 3.43E-07 Bq/g on 516.75 cm from 
the reactor core. The clearance boundary assessed as 425 cm with the clearance level regulation 
with multiple nuclides. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18. Total radioactivity concentration 
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Table 28. Total radioactivity concentration with impact factors 
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Ⅵ. Safety, Economics and Waste Management for Bioshield 
6.1 External Dose for Workers on Bioshield in Kori unit 1 
 
From the activation level data, it is possible to generate safety guideline for the filed workers on 
the structure and give insight on decontamination method selection. The current limitation on the 
Republic of Korea regulates field worker’s permission as 20 mSv/year [18]. Although radioactive 
inventory analysis was initiated based mainly focused on the horizontal distance from the reactor 
core, it is more adequate to focus on the height of the bioshield since the decontamination process 
would be done at the side of the structure with the vertical process. From Table 28, each radiation 
of nuclides was first assessed, and the result was converted into the vertical graphic of external 
dose which is shown in Figure 19 and Figure 20. The maximum dose rate was shown on 165 cm 
with 5.55E+00 mSv/h and the lowest rate was on 1485 cm with 7.25E-01 mSv/h. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 19. External dose rate on Kori unit 1 bioshield 
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Table 29. External dose rate on major nuclides [mSv/h] 
Height (cm) 60Co 152Eu 154Eu 134Cs Total 
1485 6.89.E-01 2.90.E-02 4.35.E-02 7.25.E-03 7.25.E-01 
1320 7.74.E-01 3.26.E-02 4.89.E-02 8.15.E-03 8.15.E-01 
1155 8.69.E-01 3.66.E-02 5.49.E-02 9.15.E-03 9.15.E-01 
990 1.19.E+00 5.00.E-02 7.50.E-02 1.25.E-02 1.25.E+00 
825 1.52.E+00 6.40.E-02 9.60.E-02 1.60.E-02 1.60.E+00 
660 2.00.E+00 8.40.E-02 1.26.E-01 2.10.E-02 2.10.E+00 
495 2.61.E+00 1.10.E-01 1.65.E-01 2.75.E-02 2.75.E+00 
330 3.52.E+00 1.48.E-01 2.22.E-01 3.70.E-02 3.70.E+00 
165 5.27.E+00 2.22.E-01 3.33.E-01 5.55.E-02 5.55.E+00 
 
 
Figure 20. External dose for workers with major nuclides [hr] 
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Since current regulation on professional radiological workers on the field permits 20 mSv/year, 
the possible working hours in a year should be limited as shown in Table 29. As shown in Figure 
21, the maximum working hour per personal is 2.76E+01 hr on 1485 cm region from the floor and 
the minimum hour is 3.60 hr on 165 cm region from the floor. Since most of the high duration 
process and the high-risk dose occur at the bottom of the structure, sensitivity test with added 
regional space analysis should be made from 330 cm height to 165 cm region for further concrete 
reliability. 
 
Table 30. Permittable working hour on bioshield 
Height (cm) Working hour limit (hr) 
1485 2.76.E+01 
1320 2.45.E+01 
1155 2.19.E+01 
990 1.60.E+01 
825 1.25.E+01 
660 9.52.E+00 
495 7.27.E+00 
330 5.41.E+00 
165 3.60.E+00 
 
 
Figure 21. Bioshield region possible working hour in a year 
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From the permittable working hour limitation data, it is possible to clarify which method could 
be used on decontamination of the bioshield. The decontamination method is separated into two 
branches. First, chemical decontamination holds high purification capability of up to 99 %. 
However, it has difficulty in using on-site for real time. In addition, a large amount of secondary 
waste is generated from the solution that was used on the process.  
Second, physical decontamination could be divided into two major schemes. Scabbling uses 
tungsten carbide head with 100 hours of a lifetime on it. Its efficiency is 0.25 ~ 0.5 m2/h with 3 
mm depth decontamination. Shaving uses the diamond head with 40 hours lifetime on it. Its 
efficiency is 15 ~ 25 m2/h with 3 mm depth penetration [24, 25]. For comparing the usage of two 
heads, amendments on efficiency is required. In order to match both heads to 3 mm depth 
decontamination in 1 hour, scabbling requires an average 50 people and shaving requires average 
1 person on the bioshield of Kori unit 1. Since the clearance boundary is 425 cm from the reactor 
core, it requires 363 hours of working time. As shown in Figure 22, scabbling needs steady supply 
total of 3522 people and shaving requires a total of 70 people on a year.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 22. Human resource requirement on decontamination of the bioshield 
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6.2 Spatial Distribution for Radioactivity Waste 
 
The D&D project on Kori unit 1 would be initiated with the immediate release of license. 
According to the brief timeline, the decontamination and dismantling of the bioshield would be 
done within 5 to 10 years after the shutdown of the facility. In order to identify classification, the 
change on the amount of the radioactive waste, as shown in Figure 23, the clearance boundary and 
waste amount is analyzed from 5 years after the shutdown to 30 years with a gap of 5 years. Since 
conservative analysis is required for estimation of the potential waste amount study, 200 cm 
through 400 cm height region which hold the highest radioactivity concentration was chosen as the 
criteria for assessment. As shown in Figure 24, it showed 2428 of 200 L drums at 5 years, and 
1902 of 200 L drums at 30 years. No significance reduction after 10 years.  
 
 
Figure 23. Total radioactivity on the timeline after the shutdown of the facility 
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Figure 24. Generation of radioactive waste on timeline after the shutdown of the facility 
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6.3 Cost Reduction by Waste Volume Reduction 
 
As the amount of the LLW (Low-Level Waste) has been analyzed, it is possible to estimate the 
budget on managing radioactive waste. Current regulation on the Republic of Korea regards 1 drum 
of 200 L LLW requires 12,080 USD. Under consideration as entire Bioshield as LLW without 
radioactive inventory investigation, it would cost 53 M USD. However as shown in Table 30 and 
Figure 25, radioactive inventory assessment has been done it would cost 29 M USD at 5 years 
after the shutdown and 23 USD at the year of 30 after the shutdown. It reaches 42 % decreasing at 
5 years and 56 % decrease at 30 years. Since the field decontamination and dismantling process 
would be initiated after 2024, which is 5 years after the shutdown of Kori unit 1 it requires 
comparison with other case studies. As shown in Table 31, Trojan, Haddam Neck, and Maine 
Yankee nuclear power plants showed each with 30 %, 25 %, and 25 % increasing between 
estimation and real cost [26], due to limitation of the analysis variables including 3D spatial 
distribution of radioactivity. Since the research has overcome the existing limitation on previous 
foreign nuclear power plants, the difference rate between estimated waste management budget and 
real budget would be optimized to the minimum.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 31. Kori unit 1 bioshield waste managing budget 
Year Waste managing budget (M. USD) 
5 29 
10 28 
15 27 
20 25 
25 24 
30 23 
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Figure 25. Kori unit 1 bioshield waste managing budget 
 
Table 32. Waste management budget status 
Plant Reactor type 
Electrical capacity 
(MW) 
Estimated waste 
management cost 
(M USD) 
Real waste managing 
budget 
(M USD) 
Kori unit 1 PWR 576 58 N/A 
Trojan PWR 1095 37 52 
Haddam Neck PWR 603 75.8 112 
Maine Yankee PWR 900 82.5 110 
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Ⅶ. Conclusion 
The research is aimed to assess the radioactivity of bioshield in Kori unit 1. The bioshield was 
contaminated by radioactive nuclides at an average of 812 Bq/g and 60Co makes up the largest 
proportion of nuclides in the entire structure. 
From the assessment of radioactive inventory, the clearance boundary was identified in order to clarify 
the amount of the LLW. It showed the bioshield structure can be considered as non-radioactive waste at 
the point 425 cm from the reactor core and a total of 2437 drums of LLW would be generated from the 
D&D. From the estimation of the waste generation, it is expected to be minimum 29 M USD would be 
required on managing LLW.  
The radioactivity of major nuclides was converted into potential external dose exposure rate for 
assessing worker guideline and give insight on choosing of decontamination scheme. Since the 
Bioshield has been activated due to high neutron absorption, working hours should be limited. Average 
possible working hours according to dose levels should be 14 hours, with a maximum of 27.6 hours at 
the lowest dosage and a minimum of 3.6 hours at the highest. 
This study has introduced a scheme to assess the Kori-1 Bioshield radioactive inventory for 
classification of its activation and amount of waste generated from the decommissioning process before 
the initiation of the real field dismantling and decommissioning process starts. The model provides 
results within a reasonable amount of error and can be utilized as a basic tool to assess other domestic 
PWR nuclear power plants. 
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